1
It is widely recognized that equity mutual fund performance does not persist in the long term, even though some studies indicate that short-term persistence exists.
1 Two alternative explanations for the lack of long-term persistence are fund flows (Berk and Green (2004) ) and manager turnover (Khorana (1996 (Khorana ( , 2001 ). In this paper, we investigate how far these two "equilibrating mechanisms" 2 explain mean reversion in mutual fund performance and whether they interact as substitutes or complements. If they are complements, then they should be more effective in eliminating performance persistence when operating together. If they are substitutes, then the incremental effect of one mechanism, conditional on the other operating, should be close to zero. In fact, we document an asymmetric effect for past outperforming (winner) and past underperforming (loser) funds, based on a sample of 3,946 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from 1992 to 2007. For outperforming funds, fund flows and manager changes are substitutes, but these two mechanisms complement each other in underperforming funds.
For winner funds, we find that those funds experiencing neither of the equilibrating mechanisms -having relatively low net inflows and no manager change -outperform those winner funds in which both mechanisms operate, with an average annualized spread of 3.60
percentage points in the following year. The interaction between the two mechanisms among winner funds is low. High net inflows reduce subsequent performance independently of whether 1 See, e.g., Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) , Carhart (1997) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) for long-term persistence and Bollen and Busse (2005) , Busse and Irvine (2006) and Huij and Verbeek (2007) for short-term persistence. Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010) document a similar pattern for institutional funds. 2 This terminology was introduced by Berk and Green (2004, p 1271) .
We find that performance persists when funds are not exposed to at least one equilibrating mechanism.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a review of the literature and our hypotheses. In section 3, we describe our data set and explain our research methodology. Our results are discussed in section 4. Using ranked portfolio tests, we analyze fund flows, manager changes and their interaction for winner and loser funds separately, examine then the spread in winner-loser performance, before finally undertaking a robustness check using a pooled regression approach. Section 5 concludes and discusses the implications of our findings.
I Literature Review and Hypotheses
Berk and Green (2004) argue that mutual fund market equilibrium is attained through fund flows.
These respond to past performance, but due to decreasing returns to scale in active fund management, the growth in fund size of recent winner funds causes their performance to deteriorate, while loser-fund performance benefits from a shrinking asset base. Chen et al. (2004) and Yan (2008) find that transaction costs are positively correlated with fund size and the degree of illiquidity of the investment strategy and that small funds outperform large funds. However, regarding the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis this is only an indirect test. Although the finding that small funds outperform large funds is consistent with decreasing returns to scale in fund management, differences in fund sizes are the result of both external growth due to the inflows accumulated throughout a fund"s full history since inception and internal growth through differential performance. Consequently, we focus only on the recent year"s fund flows as a flow variable, in contrast to fund size as a state variable, to analyze its equilibrium effect. Sirri and 4 Tufano (1998) and Lynch and Musto (2003) document that past outperformance triggers large inflows, but that investors in poorly performing funds fail to withdraw their investments.
Explanations for such a behavior include the anticipation of either a strategy change by the incumbent manager or the firing of a poorly performing manager, or a disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman (1985) ). Consequently, the persistence of poor performance might be due to investor inertia (Berk and Tonks (2007)). Edelen (1999) and Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2007) argue that excessive inflows or outflows encourage liquidity-motivated, rather than valuation-motivated trading and induce immediate transaction costs, both of which are detrimental to short-run fund performance.
Rakowski (2010) reports that funds with more volatile flows underperform those with less volatile flows, in which case outflows are as harmful for future performance as inflows, a finding that is incompatible with Berk and Green"s (2004) conjecture that underperforming funds benefit from withdrawals. Even worse, large outflows result in liquidity-motivated fire sales which distort fund performance and impose even higher costs on loser funds (Coval and Stafford (2007) ). Thus, we anticipate asymmetric effects of fund flows on loser funds and winner funds, and we analyze each group separately. Khorana (1996) , Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Gallagher and Nadarajah (2004) all document an inverse relationship between fund performance and manager changes. Star fund managers can extract a larger share of the higher fee income by either moving to a larger fund within the same organization or to another fund family altogether (Hu, Hall, and Harvey (2000) ).
Moreover, a successful manager anticipating that she will be unable to repeat her outstanding 5 performance in the future may decide to use her current favorable track record to find a higherpaid job with a new fund management company. In this case, the decision to stay or to leave will be the result of the manager"s own assessment of her investment skill. The winner fund that loses its star manager will need to hire a new manager, presumably with lower skills. Therefore, we would expect fund performance to deteriorate after the hiring of a new manager. Khorana (2001) documents that a manager change in outperforming funds results in a deterioration in performance from 1.9 percent in the pre-replacement period to 0.4 percent in the third year after replacement. Loser-fund managers, in contrast, might be demoted to smaller funds of the same family or fired after a period of poor performance. Khorana (2001) reports that the performance of recently underperforming funds improves if the manager is replaced, in which case abnormal performance rises from -2.40 percent to 0.50 percent in the third year after replacement. Hence, manager changes appear to rectify negative performance persistence.
However, there exist several reasons to believe that fund flows and manager changes are not independent of each other. Both mechanisms will be triggered by past performance, and the results of Khorana (2001) that manager changes affect future fund performance, might in part be attributable to the effect of contemporaneous fund flows. Thus, it is important to control for this interaction. Moreover, fund flows might have a differential effect on fund performance for new managers as compared with continuing managers. In order to investigate these interaction effects in detail, we classify the fund flows and manager change mechanisms as being substitutes if the performance impact of one mechanism is smaller when the other mechanism operates simultaneously. Similarly, fund flows and manager changes are interpreted as being complements 6 if the performance impact of one mechanism is larger when it operates jointly with the other mechanism. In those cases where the performance impact of each mechanism is the same, irrespective of whether it operates separately from or in combination with the other mechanism, we will classify the mechanisms as being independent of each other.
In the case of winner funds, fund flows and manager changes might be substitutes because if net inflows remain low despite superior past performance, the fund manager might be unable to negotiate an acceptable compensation package, increasing the likelihood of her leaving. 3 In contrast, if the fund is subject to high net inflows, the manager might decide to stay and reap the benefits from a larger asset base and higher fees. Moreover, if investors observe that the star manager has left, they may rationally anticipate that superior past performance will be less of a predictor of future performance, resulting in a weaker relation between past performance and current fund flows in the case of a manager change. A further reason for these mechanisms being substitutes is that a newly appointed fund manager is likely to adjust the portfolio holdings towards her own personal investment strategy. If large net inflows occur at the same time, the manager might be able to use these inflows efficiently to adjust the portfolio weights and, by doing so, reduce the marginal negative performance impact of high net inflows.
However, based on the findings of Pollet and Wilson (2008) that fund managers scale up existing holdings as a response to inflows, it could be the case that fund flows and manager changes are complements among winner funds. Specifically, if managerial skill determines the 7 number of "best ideas" a manager is able to generate and the newly hired manager has lower skills relative to the former manager, then the same level of inflows should have a stronger impact on performance of winner funds with a manager change than on those without.
Whether these mechanisms are substitutes or complements is an empirical question that our data set allows us to investigate. We propose to address the following hypotheses and questions about the joint effects of fund flows and manager changes on performance persistence in outperforming equity mutual funds:  Fund flows: Investors chase past performance and future performance suffers from high inflows, leading to stronger mean reversion for winner funds with higher net inflows.

Manager changes: A fund manager who leaves a winner fund is replaced with a less skilled manager, resulting in reduced performance and stronger mean reversion for winner funds with a manager change.
 Interaction: Fund flows and manager changes, when occurring simultaneously, have either magnifying (complements) or offsetting (substitutes) effects.
With respect to loser funds, Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2008) develop a model in which poorly performing managers are subject to both "external governance" (investors withdraw funds) and "internal governance" (the termination of a manager contract). These internal and external governance mechanisms are potential substitutes. If the manager has been replaced, investors will no longer see any reason to withdraw money and instead will remain invested, waiting for a performance reversal. Similarly, if money has flowed out of the fund, the 8 management company might decide that the existing manager will be able to improve fund performance with the smaller asset base (Berk and Green (2004) ).
Alternatively, internal and external governance in loser funds could reinforce each other and act as complements. If the market has reacted quickly to poor past performance, the management company might fire a poorly performing manager in an attempt to stem outflows.
Furthermore, causality might also be reversed: if the disposition effect explains why many investors in poorly performing funds do not withdraw their investments, a manager replacement might serve as an attention trigger. Once investors are aware of both the manager change and the underperformance, they might start pulling money out. 4 Cremers and Nair (2005) Finally, we examine the spread in performance persistence between winner and loser funds. We predict that if both equilibrating mechanisms operate on winner and loser funds, then the spread between winner and loser funds" subsequent performance will be narrower than when these mechanisms are not present.
II Data and Research Methodology

A Data
Our mutual fund sample from CRSP starts in 1992, the first year for which reliable information on manager changes becomes available, and ends in 2007. We follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and select only actively managed domestic equity funds (see Appendix). We aggregate all share classes of the same fund and drop all observations prior to the IPO date given by CRSP and 10 funds without names in order to account for a potential incubation bias (Evans (2010) Monthly fund flows are constructed from the change in total net assets adjusted for internal growth due to investment returns: ,
where TNA it refers to the total net assets of fund i at the end of period t and r it is the return of fund i between t-1 and t, assuming that all distributions are reinvested and are net of fund expenses. On average, each fund received 2.70 million USD net inflows per month.
5 Fees are calculated as the sum of the annual expense ratio and 1/7 of the sum of the front end and back end loads. See also French (2008) for an analysis of changes in the fee structure over time.
To obtain information on manager changes, we focus on the variable "mgr_date" in the CRSP database, instead of using the specific names of the managers. 6 This variable provides the date of the last manager change as reported by the fund management company. By using the manager date variable, we avoid any problems associated with different spellings of manager names. Furthermore, as the number of team-managed funds increased during recent years, the manager date variable has the advantage that fund management companies only report significant changes in manager that might have an impact on performance (Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz (2010)). A total of 6,029 manager changes occurred during our sample period and, on average, 19 percent of the fund managers are replaced each year.
B Research Methodology
We use both ranked portfolio tests (Carhart (1997), Carpenter and Lynch (1999) , Tonks (2005)) and pooled regressions to investigate the hypotheses in Section 2. The performance criteria used to form the decile portfolios is based on the alpha of each fund in the previous year. Specifically, funds are ranked based on alphas from a Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimated over the previous 12 months (the formation period). Fund excess returns accounting for different fund styles are given by:
Ranked portfolio tests
.
To efficiently estimate a four-factor model over such a short horizon, we apply a Bayesian adjustment (Huij and Verbeek (2007)). This procedure estimates the Carhart model for each fund separately using OLS, and the averages of the parameters of all other funds during the same period are used as priors. The final alpha and beta parameters for each individual fund are 7 In Berk and Green (2004) , active management suffers from decreasing returns to scale, but it is an empirical question whether these capacity constraints are absolute or relative. Absolute capacity constraints arise once a certain threshold of absolute fund size is exceeded and depend on absolute fund flows. Relative capacity constraints differ across investment strategies and arise after the fund receives a certain level of inflows relative to the initial fund size. We analyze both absolute and relative net inflows, but, in the presentation of our results, we concentrate on absolute flows because the results for relative fund flows are qualitatively very similar though slightly weaker.
13 obtained as weighted averages of the OLS parameters and the prior, where the weights depend on the estimation efficiency of the OLS parameters. Thus, the Bayesian adjustment "shrinks" any extreme parameters towards a grand mean, taking into account the cross-sectional distribution of the parameters. As with Cohen, Coval, and Pastor (2005) , this adjustment means that it is less likely that a fund will genuinely generate high alphas if all other funds generate relatively low alphas during the same period.
In the evaluation period, we used raw returns and three different factor models to evaluate performance. The first is the four-factor Carhart model as specified in equation (2). The second is a five-factor model that adds a mean reversion factor 8 to the Carhart model: if winner funds hold on to winner stocks for another one or two years, these winner stocks might eventually experience mean reversion in returns (De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) ). The third is a fivefactor model that adds a liquidity-factor 9 to the Carhart model on the grounds that fund flows might also affect portfolio liquidity. However, we only present the four-factor model results and comment on the other specifications if they provide additional insights.
Regression We also perform a pooled regression with the difference in annualized performance between the evaluation year and the formation year as the dependent variable. These performance changes over time are then regressed on a set of control variables, including net inflows and a manager change dummy. This regression offers insights into the impact of fund flows and manager changes on fund performance over time. Furthermore, it provides us with the opportunity not only of separating the effects of fund flows and manager changes, but also of measuring their marginal impact and their interaction with other fund characteristics.
III Empirical Results
A Performance Persistence
Figure 2 (Table II) . They grow to an average size of 1,083.00 million USD in the evaluation period due to internal (investment performance) and external growth (fund flows). Conditioning on fund flows, we separate winner funds into a subgroup with "low absolute net inflows" during the formation period averaging -4.50 million USD per month and a subgroup with "high absolute net inflows" averaging 25.78 million USD per month, a significant difference of 30.28 million USD.
The fraction of managers leaving winner funds is similar for both subgroups at 20 percent, but winner funds with low absolute net inflows tend to be smaller (507.53 million USD) than winner funds with high absolute net inflows (1,041.47 million USD). 10 Conditioning on manager changes yields a subgroup "without manager change" which has slightly higher inflows and a larger fund size compared to the subgroup "with manager change" (Table II, panel (c) ).
[ Please insert Table II about here ]
Decile-10 funds on average generate four-factor alphas of 0.05 percent per month, equivalent to a mean reversion from the formation to the evaluation period of 0.83 percentage points per month (Table IV, (Table III, panel (c) ). The evaluation-period spread in four-factor alphas of 0.30 percentage points per month between winner funds suffering from neither mechanism and those experiencing both is highly significant, both in statistical and economic terms. Fund flows and manager changes strongly contribute to mean reversion in winner-fund performance.
[ Please insert Tables III and IV and Figure 3 about here ]
As we have seen in Table II , the occurrence of a manager change seems to be independent of fund flows, since, on average, 20 percent of managers change each year in both subgroups with high and low net inflows. The difference in fund flows between winner funds without and those with a manager change is statistically significant but economically small at 4.44 million USD. We conclude that the incidence of one mechanism does not affect the likelihood of the other mechanism occurring.
Even though the occurrence of either mechanism appears to be independent, controlling for one mechanism could still alter the impact of the other mechanism on future investment
performance. Yet, among winner funds, the evidence for any form of interaction (either as complement or substitute) is rather weak. Irrespective of whether the manager changes or not, fund flows have a significantly negative impact on performance of between 0.21 and 0.22 percentage points per month (Table IV, panel (a) ). This result is almost identical to that from the single sorting on fund flows. When controlling for fund flows and investigating the effects of a manager change, alpha declines by an insignificant 0.07 percentage points for the low-inflow subgroup and by an equally insignificant 0.09 percentage points for the high-inflow subgroup compared with the case without a manager change, slightly less than the statistically significant decline of 0.10 percentage points when not controlling for fund flows (i.e., a single sorting).
Again, whether the fund-flow mechanism is operating does not affect the performance impact of the manager-change mechanism by very much. However, controlling for fund flows slightly reduces the overall negative impact of manager changes on winner funds compared with the single sorting results, indicating that the negative impact of manager changes on winner-fund performance documented by Khorana (2001) might be slightly overstated. We conclude that both fund flows and manager changes significantly affect winner-fund performance and are relatively independent of each other. But the high net inflows are more harmful for subsequent performance than a manager change, possibly as a result of the transaction costs triggered by liquidity-induced trading.
C Loser funds
Loser funds, on average, are smaller compared with winner funds with total net assets of 692.31 million USD in the formation period (Table V) . Fund size remains relatively stable over time and decreases only slightly to 684.61 million USD in the evaluation period. This is explained by net inflows being negative, as expected, although small in magnitude at only -1.27 million USD per month on average. Many investors are reluctant to withdraw money from poorly performing funds. We sort the loser-decile-1 funds into two subgroups on the basis of net inflows, with the subgroup experiencing the lowest net inflows averaging at monthly negative net inflows (i.e. [ Please insert Table V about (Table VI) . The spread in four-factor alphas between loser funds experiencing both governance mechanisms and those not benefiting from either is a highly significant 0.20 percentage points per month. Thus, if operating simultaneously, internal and external governance strongly contribute to an improvement in loser-fund performance.
[ Please insert Tables 
20
The results for raw returns are similar though slightly smaller in magnitude, especially in the case where both mechanisms are not operating simultaneously. In fact, outflows appear to improve loser-fund raw returns even if the manager is not replaced. The low-minus-high rawreturn spread is a hardly significant 0.11 percentage points even in the case of no manager change. Compared to the lower four-factor alpha spread of the same subgroup, this implies that fund managers who stay on do not seem to use the outflows to reoptimize their portfolio by bringing in new investment ideas, but merely to scale down existing investments in a way that reduces unfavorable loadings on the benchmark factors used in the four-factor model.
Specifically, loser funds without outflows have significantly negative momentum loadings, while those experiencing outflows reduce these loadings to levels close to zero (not reported in the tables).
We conclude that loser funds suffer from two types of disposition effect: one due to investor behavior and one due to the actions of the fund management company. It appears that a large fraction of loser-fund investors are reluctant to withdraw their money. This behavior is consistent with a disposition effect, whereby investors are hesitant to realize losses and so stay invested in the hope that the fund price eventually returns to the original purchase price.
However, our results show that staying invested in loser funds is a sub-optimal strategy, because performance remains negative. In contrast, investors could earn 0.18 percent abnormal monthly returns by switching to previous-year winner funds with lower inflows and no manager change.
The second disposition effect relates to the reluctance of the fund management company to fire the underperforming manager. Even when outflows occur, as in case of the low-inflow subgroups, the performance of existing fund managers does not respond positively to the smaller asset base. It is only when outflows are combined with a manager change that performance improves.
D Winner-Loser spreads
We now extend our analysis and explore the effect of these equilibrating mechanisms on the subsequent spread in winner and loser portfolio returns. The spread in four-factor alphas between the winner and the loser portfolio is 0.29 percentage points per month for the 12-month evaluation periods, obtained as the difference between the unconditional four-factor alphas in panel (a) of Table IV and Table VII . By coincidence, this spread corresponds exactly to the winner-minus-loser spread in the Carhart (1997) study, although his spread is statistically significant. The interesting issue now is how this spread is affected by the equilibrating mechanisms. Specifically, we compare the performance of the winner and loser portfolios in six different scenarios, which are defined in panel (a) of Table VIII . Panel (b) reports the corresponding four-factor alphas. In the first column of panel (b), we report the four-factor alphas of funds that experience neither equilibrating mechanism. Our hypotheses suggest that we would expect to find the highest level of positive and negative performance persistence among these funds. The next two columns report the performance results when either manager change or fund flows is not operating. The fourth column reports the unconditional winner-minus-loser spread, not taking fund flows or manager changes into account. The next two columns report the results for funds that experience one of the mechanisms. In the last column, both mechanisms operate 22 simultaneously. In this last case we would expect to find the strongest tendency of fund performance to revert to the mean.
[ Please insert Table VIII about here ]
Indeed, we find that winner and loser funds that experience neither mechanism yield a highly significant winner-minus-loser spread of 0.47 percentage points per month (Table VIII and Figure 5 ). This spread falls once we condition on funds not experiencing one of the equilibrating mechanisms (but without conditioning on the other one). For the unconditional winner-minusloser spread portfolio, alphas turn out to be insignificant at 0.29 percent. This spread decreases further when concentrating only on funds that experience either the manager-change mechanism or the fund-flow mechanism to an insignificant 0.14 percentage points in both cases. For winner and loser funds that experience both equilibrating mechanisms simultaneously, we find an insignificant spread between winner and loser funds of -0.03 percentage points.
[ Please insert Figure 5 about here ] Thus, when investors and managers take advantage of outperformance or react to underperformance in the formation period, the equilibrium processes force the spread between previous winner and loser funds to become virtually zero (-0.03) in the evaluation period. In contrast, if funds are not exposed to these mechanisms, the spread is a still significant 0.47 percentage points. Thus, the equilibrating mechanisms seem to be able to explain the reduction in the winner-minus-loser spread by 0.50 percentage points per months or by 6.00 percentage points 23 per annum. This highlights the importance of fund flows and manager changes in explaining mean reversion in mutual fund performance and why mutual fund performance is unlikely to persist in well functioning markets.
E Regression Analysis
In this section, we perform a pooled regression of the change in annualized Bayesian four-factor alphas between the formation and evaluation periods on relative net inflows, manager changes and a set of other control variables documented in the literature as having an impact on performance. 11 We focus on relative flows in this section because they are more comparable across funds. The aims are threefold: first, by controlling for other performance determinants, we are able to measure the marginal impact of fund flows and manager changes, as well as the interaction with other control variables; second, it allows us to analyze the performance impact of both equilibrating mechanisms over time; and third, it serves as a robustness check.
In our first model, we include the following additional control variables: 12 fund size (total net assets), fund fees, fund age and the portfolio turnover ratio. 13 Because there is a strong tendency for the extremes in fund performance to revert to the mean, we add to our regression two dummy variables that indicate whether a fund is currently in decile 10 or decile 1, based on 11 We winsorize all variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentile to avoid any influence from extreme outliers. 12 Chen et al. (2004) and Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find a negative effect of fund size on performance; Carhart (1997) documents a negative effect from fees; Huij and Verbeek (2007) and Karoui and Meier (2009) report an outperformance of young funds. Results on turnover are ambiguous. Elton et al. (1993) and Carhart (1997) find a negative relation, Wermers (2000) documents that turnover is not associated with fund performance and Dahlquist, Engstroem, and Soederlind (2000) and Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find a positive relationship. 13 The portfolio turnover ratio is defined as the minimum of aggregated sales and aggregated purchases of securities, divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. It measures the fraction of the portfolio traded over the previous 12 months. previous-year performance. These dummies capture the pure mean reversion effect and ensure that the other coefficients are not biased. The key variables of interest are net inflows and the manager change dummy. We also include an interaction term between fund flows and the decile-10 and decile-1-dummies in order to analyze the differential effects of fund flows on performance in the top and bottom funds. Similarly, we use a manager-change dummy indicating whether the fund manager has been replaced during the previous year and an interaction term between manager change and the decile-10 and decile-1-dummies.
In a second model, we analyze the impact of being a small-cap or a sector fund on performance and the marginal impact of fund flows on winner and loser funds that belong to these two investment-style categories. We anticipate that capacity constraints are more prevalent in narrow and illiquid markets and, as a result, fund flows have a stronger impact on performance in these investment categories. A third model investigates the interaction effect between a manager change and the fund being a member of a large fund family. Gervais, Lynch, and Musto (2005) argue that the replacement of an underperforming manager in a large fund family reveals more information than the replacement of a manager in a small fund family. We assign a fund to the large-family group if the number of funds offered by its fund family at the end of the previous year is higher than the 70 th percentile. A fourth model assesses the interaction between the manager-change and fund-flow mechanisms. Specifically, we include a dummy for winner funds that have higher-than-median net inflows and a manager change and a dummy for loser funds that have lower-than-median net inflows (i.e., high net outflows) and a manager change.
Since we measure the change in performance between consecutive years, a significant coefficient on one of the control variables would indicate a trend in performance over time. We document a significant negative relationship between relative net inflows and This supports the findings from the ranked portfolio tests.
IV Conclusions and Implications
We have examined the role of fund flows and manager changes as equilibrating mechanisms that explain the elimination of persistence in mutual fund performance over time. Using a CRSP sample of 3,946 actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from 1992 to 2007, we find that a significant part of the mean reversion in winner funds and loser funds can be explained by the two mechanisms, i.e. by the responses of investors, fund managers, and fund management companies to past performance.
In the case of winner funds, these effects are much more important in explaining belowaverage performance than, say, the impact of fees. We provide empirical support for the Berk and
Green (2004) We also analyze the spread between the subsequent performance of winner and loser funds, as a measure of performance persistence, with and without changes in fund flows and fund management. The comparison of the winner-minus-loser spread reveals that both mechanisms strongly contribute to performance persistence and to mean reversion. The unconditional winnerminus-loser spread is 0.29 percentage points but insignificant. However, when we separate out the effects, we find that conditioning only on those winner and loser funds that are not exposed to both equilibrating mechanisms, the performance spread increases to a highly significant 0.47 percentage points, indicating strong performance persistence. When these winner and loser funds experience both types of mechanisms simultaneously, the corresponding spread is dramatically reduced to an insignificant -0.03 percentage points.
What are the potential implications of these findings? First of all, investors should pay close attention to fund flows and the resulting changes in fund size as well as to the career paths of individual fund managers across different funds: our results show that superior past performance is only a reliable indicator of future performance for those cases where the manager remains in post and fund flows are not responsive to past performance. Second, it would be very valuable for investors if fund management companies were required to publish regular information on fund flows and report any manager changes immediately.
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Appendix: Data Selection
In constructing our sample, we follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and select only domestic equity funds. We exclude international funds, global funds, balanced funds, flexible funds, and funds of funds. We further drop all funds containing terms in their name that commonly refer to passive vehicles. We require our funds to have at least 12 months of return data available to be included in our sample. Additionally, we drop all observations prior to the IPO date given by CRSP and funds without names in order to account for a potential incubation bias (Evans (2010)). This results in 3,948 funds that existed at some time during our sample period from 1992 to 2007. Different share classes of the same fund have the same manager and fund flows of individual share classes might cancel out at the portfolio level. Hence, we combine all share classes that belong to the same fund and have the same underlying portfolio to one observation.
We use a matching algorithm that combines information from the fund's name and the portfolio number variable given by CRSP. 14 Fund characteristics, such as the investment objective or the first offer date, are taken from the oldest share class. Quantitative information is either summed up, such as total net assets, or the weighted average over all share classes are taken, such as returns and fees. If two share classes of the same funds have different manager change dates, we use the most recent date. We classify the funds in our sample into three groups: (1) Large and mid-cap funds (LMC), (2) small-cap funds (SC) and (3) Table X . A fund is assigned to one of the three groups for the total sample period if it belonged to this group for at least 50 percent of the observations in our sample period.
[ Please insert Table X about here ] This figure presents the methodology we apply to construct the subgroup portfolios. Funds are first sorted into deciles based on their performance in the formation period. Then, the winner (decile 10) and loser (decile 1) funds are further divided into: (a) a low-net-inflow (high-net-inflow) subgroup if the net inflows in the formation period are lower (higher) than the median net inflows of the decile which the funds belong to (we use either absolute net inflows or relative net inflows, but, in the presentation of our results, we concentrate on absolute flows, see also footnote 7); (b) a without (with) manager-change subgroup if the manager remained the same (changed) during the formation period; and (c) into four subgroups combining the criteria in (a) and (b) in a double sorting mechanism.
(a) absolute / relative flows This figure presents the four-factor alphas for winner funds and winner-fund subgroups based on a single sorting and also a double sorting on absolute fund flows and / or manager change. The top panel presents the level of performance (four-factor alpha) in the evaluation period and the bottom panel presents the change in performance between the formation and evaluation periods (∆ alpha). Funds are assigned to the high-netinflow (high) or low-net-inflow (low) subgroup based on whether their net inflows during the formation period are higher or lower than the median net inflows of all other funds in the same decile. Funds are assigned to the manager-change (with) or no-manager-change (without) subgroup based on whether their fund manager changed during the formation period. Portfolios are formed based on previous-year Bayesian four-factor alphas.
* * * , * * and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White's heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used for the regression coefficients. This table presents the characteristics of the sample of funds for 48-month subperiods and for the whole period from 1992 to 2007. We restrict our sample to funds that have at least 12 months of available return data and information on the variable "mgr date" in the CRSP database (see Appendix). Row (1) reports the number of months in the respective period; row (2) reports monthly (arithmetic) average raw returns in excess of the rate on the risk-free asset in percent; row (3) reports the average portfolio turnover in percent; row (4) reports average fees in percent; row (5) reports the average age of the funds in years; row (6) reports the average fund size in million USD; row (7) reports monthly average absolute net inflows in million USD; row (8) reports the number of funds in existence; and row (9) This table presents the results of a pooled regression for the change in annualized Bayesian four-factor alphas between the formation and evaluation years. The explanatory variables of model 1 are total net assets (TNA) in billion USD, fees in percent, fund age in years and portfolio turnover in the previous year, two dummies that indicate whether the fund is currently in decile 10 or decile 1 based on previous year performance, respectively, relative fund flows for previous year, an interaction term between fund flows and the decile-10 and decile-1 dummy, respectively, a dummy indicating whether the manager changed during the previous year, an interaction term between a manager change and the decile-10 and decile-1 dummy, respectively. Model 2 additionally contains a dummy indicating whether the fund is a small-cap or sector fund (SC/SEC) and an interaction term between fund flows into small-cap or sector funds and the decile-10 and decile-1 dummy, respectively. Model 3 additionally contains an interaction term indicating whether the manager change among decile-10 and decile-1 funds, respectively, occurred in a large fund family.
Model 4 additionally contains a dummy indicating whether the fund was ranked into decile 10, had higher-than-median flows and a manager change during the previous year and a dummy indicating whether the fund was ranked into decile 1, had lower-than-median flows and a manager change during the previous year. The last two rows present the number of observations and the adjusted R 
